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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
ZONING
REFUSAL OF SPECIAL ZONING EXCEPTION WHERE SnMLAR EXCEPTIONS WERE
GRANTED WAS NOT ARBITRARY

Petitioner applied to a town board for a special exception to install gasoline
storage tanks and conduct a service station. The board refused his application
stating the grounds that the proposed location was too near to a shopping
center and a school and that it fronted on a heavily trafficked street. The lower
court reversed the board's determination and granted the application.' Appellate
Division reversed. On appeal, held, affirmed, two judges dissenting. The board's
refusal was not arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion. Lemir Realty Corp.
v. Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 181 N.E.2d 407, 226 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1962).
The discretion of a town board in granting or refusing zoning variances and
exceptions is grounded in statute.2 Review of the board's discretionary action
merely tests that action against a standard of reasonableness, 3 the definition
of which provides the problem. In Larkin v. Schwab,4 a leading case in the area,
the Court of Appeals took the position that where the board's action concerns
a subject affecting the public safety, specific standards need not be formulated
by the board as a guide to its action. Moreover, the mere fact that the board
previously granted a variance in circumstances similar to those at hand does not
make their present refusal arbitrary. Presumably, the board's refusal may have
been guided by slight differences which might sway discretion and which are
not readily apparent to the removed forum of a court. In short the board
need not bind itself by legislating narrow or particular guides nor by making
prior discretionary choices. Their action must simply comport with the broad
contours of public safety. A number of lower courts in this state have for some
time inclined to a more stringent definition of reasonableness. This test demands
that the facts recounted by the board for its decision be arguable. The
causal relation between the object of public safety and the factual matter at
the base of that object must be drawn out. This test approaches the usual
standard established for the review of administrative action, the substantial
evidence test.
To decide whether the Board's determination is reasonable, the Court
requires it to set forth, in its record of the hearing, the facts which led to its
conclusions.5 Due Process requires this, especially when the Board acts upon
its personal knowledge, so that a court will be able to determine whether the
1. 195 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1959); rev'd, 10 A-D.2d 1005, 204 N.Y.S.2d 584 (2d
Dep't 1960).
2. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance §§ X-1.0, X-1.9.
3. See Rothstein v. County Operating Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 728, 729, 185 N.Y.S.2d 813,
158 N.E.2d 507 (1959).
4.

242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926).

5. See People ex rel. Fordham Manor Ref. Church v. Walsh, 244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E.
575 (1927).
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reasons given are substantial. 6 However, the courts do not have original jurisdiction over zoning ordinances, nor may they invalidate them so long as they
are within the provisions of section 262 of the Town Law and are not by their
terms discriminatory.7 The United States Supreme Court has held that ordinances granting wide discretion to administrative officials are not prima facie
deprivations of due process or of equal protection of the law, but rather they
are a valid exercise of the police power of a state through its municipalities.8
Unlike courts, administrative tribunals are not bound by strict evidentiary
rules, nor by their prior decisions. This latter point was one of contention in
the instant case, since the board refused to grant the present application, although it had done so in similar situations. The Court refused to look to this
precedent, stating that the question was whether this petitioner had been oppressed, not whether someone else had been favored. The majority reasoned
that the stated facts went to the reasonableness of the Board's decision whereas
the dissenters believed that these facts amounted to a physical description of
the area and did not support the board's conclusions, since the Board had
submitted no evidence to support these facts, the facts upon which it apparently
based its denial. The dissent demands more explicit reasons for the board's
disregard of its decisions in similar situations and also stressed the fact that
petitioner sought a "special exception" and not a "variance." The former,
when granted by a board, allows the person seeking it to use his property in
a way expressly permitted by ordinance, in harmony with other uses permitted
in a district, whereas a variance is a permit to use property in a manner expressly Jorbidden by ordinance and depends on practical difficulty and unnecessary hardship. Thus the special exception is the more favored, and when
refused, the board should have clear and obvious grounds. The majority believes that each case of discretion stands alone and if a petitioner desires to
overturn a determination, the burden is heavily upon him to show some obvious
evidence of arbitrary, unfair misuse of discretion. The minority asks extrinsic
evidence, such as traffic counts, to support stated reasons, and clear, causal
relation between those reasons and the determination. These dissenters require
the logic of the conclusion demonstrated by the town board; they conclude
that to follow the majority rule means a granting of virtual tyranny to boards
over the economic affairs of the communities they represent.
This case illustrates the divergence between lower and upper court decisions on this point. One writer, discussing the Appellate Division decision
which the present decision has affirmed, states that it goes against many Special
Term decisions in the same department "which had held that the town board
must effectively show the manner in which such physical facts created a
6. See Wehr v. Crowley, 6 AJD.2d 214, 175 N.Y.S.2d 981 (4th Dep't 1958).
7. Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 540, 24 N.E,2d
319, 322 (1939).
8. Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361, 370-72 (1904).
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reasonable apprehension of danger or were otherwise justified by relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 9 To show the manner
means to demonstrate the causal relation between facts and conclusions.
Another writer states that New York's standard is the "substantial evidence"
test' 0 and in an earlier work defines this as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."" The
majority in the instant case, stressing unfairness, searched for evidence that
the decision was arbitrary. If the Board's conclusion can be substantiated
by evidence presented on the record, it will not be struck down as arbitrary
nor as an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the fact that an opposite conclusion could be drawn. The minority, stressing causality, thought that the
evidence must be substantial in the sense that it caused the Board to reach
that conclusion which formed its determination. By implication, the dissenters
require the Board to demonstrate its line of reasoning. Thus, town board
rulings are to all intents and purposes final, unless the petitioner has positive
evidence to prove the determinations arbitrary, or unless the town fails to
support its rulings with any reasons at all. The Court will not infer unfairness.
As here, opposite conclusions may be drawn from almost identical fact situations, as indicated in the dissent, but the town board ruling stands. The town
must explain, but its explanation need not be too explicit. The town may not be
arbitrary, but if a petitioner thinks it is, he must have strong proof. In short, if
one is to challenge a town board ruling, the weight of his evidence must be clear
and overwhelming. For now, town boards need not think out and spell out
every determination where it is clearly based on a discretionary provision in
an ordinance. The Court of Appeals has reaffirmed" its stand that town boards
must be given the greatest latitude in the determination of controversies
arising under ordinances which grant to the boards "discretion" in the licensing
of businesses.
W. W. M. Jr.
9.
10.
11.
quoting

1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning ch. 54, p. 43, n.16 (3rd ed. 1960).
Jaffe and Nathanson, Administrative Law 215-218 (1961).
Jaffe, Judicial Review; Question of Fact, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1021 (1956),
Chief Justice Hughes in Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

